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Narrowing the Digital Divide: 
A Better Broadband Universal Service 
Program 
Daniel A. Lyons∗ 
Universal service has long been an integral component of American 
telecommunications policy. As more activities move online, it becomes 
increasingly important to narrow the digital divide by helping low-income 
Americans get online and by extending broadband networks into unserved 
areas. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Communications Commission’s reforms are 
unlikely to help solve this problem. The Commission is repurposing an $8 
billion telephone subsidy program to focus instead on broadband 
networks. But when pressed, the agency admits that it has no proof that 
the program meaningfully affected telephone adoption rates, and it offers 
little evidence that it will fare any better at boosting broadband adoption. 
The Federal Universal Service Fund needs revolutionary, not 
evolutionary, change. Rather than modifying a problematic telephone-era 
program, Congress should adopt new initiatives designed to meet the 
unique challenges of the broadband era. Congress should offer targeted, 
direct, portable vouchers that improve the purchasing power of low-
income households and allow them to participate meaningfully in 
telecommunications markets. And it should create a broadband 
availability block grant program to allow state public utility commissions 
to fund new networks through a reverse auction mechanism. Finally, it 
should eliminate the current USF surcharge and instead fund the program 
directly, which would improve congressional oversight and minimize the 
fraud and abuse that has historically marred the existing program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Universal service has long been an integral component of American 
telecommunications policy. And rightly so. Communications networks 
bring communities closer together and facilitate rapid exchange of 
information among users. The purpose of universal service policies is 
to extend these networks to as many people as possible. And because 
of network effects, these policies benefit not only those added to the 
network but also all other existing users, who can now reach more 
people and endpoints.1 
Unfortunately, the Universal Service Fund has also been one of the 
most criticized programs administered by the Federal 
Communications Commission. And, again, rightly so. Lifeline spends 
over $2 billion annually2 to bring telephone service to low-income 
households, but when pressed by the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”), the Commission admitted it had no proof that the 
program meaningfully increased telephone penetration rates.3 The 
High-Cost Fund spends $4.5 billion each year4 to provide telephone 
service to rural areas, though critics argue much of these funds serve 
as little more than corporate subsidies for politically-connected rural 
carriers.5 More importantly, rising program costs and falling revenue 
 
 1 See, e.g., Steve G. Parsons & James Bixby, Universal Service in the United States: 
A Focus on Mobile Communications, 62 FED. COMM. L. J. 119, 135-36 (2010). 
 2 Lifeline Program for Low-Income Consumers, FED. COMMC’NS COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/lifeline-program-low-income-consumers (“The budget 
will be $2.279 billion for the calendar year beginning January 1, 2018.”) (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2017). 
 3 Daniel Lyons, To Narrow the Digital Divide, the FCC Should Not Simply Extend 
Lifeline to Broadband, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 1 (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/To-Narrow-the-Digital-Divide.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 
2017).  
 4 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, UNIVERSAL SERVICE MONITORING REPORT 20 (2016) 
[hereinafter UNIVERSAL SERVICE MONITORING REPORT], https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-343025A1.pdf. 
 5 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC HAS REFORMED THE HIGH-COST 
PROGRAM, BUT OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT COULD BE IMPROVED 1 (2012), 
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means the universal fund surcharge has risen from 3 percent in 1998 
to a whopping 17.9 percent in the third quarter of 2018.6 
As the Internet displaces the telephone network as America’s 
primary telecommunications platform, the Commission has embraced 
a series of reforms designed to update the universal service program 
for the twenty-first century. In 2016, it enacted a comprehensive 
reform of the Lifeline program, allowing (and eventually requiring) 
recipients to repurpose their $9.25 monthly subsidy toward Internet 
access rather than traditional telephone service.7 And the Commission 
began a slow transformation of the High-Cost Fund into a new 
initiative, the Connect America Fund, the purpose of which is to 
subsidize the construction of new broadband networks in unserved 
areas.8 
The Commission’s desire to promote broadband universal service is 
unquestionably good policy. From news to commerce to jobs and 
education, an increasing percentage of Americans’ daily activities are 
moving online.9 As this transition progresses, it becomes increasingly 
important to narrow the digital divide by helping those who cannot 
afford Internet access, or who live in areas where Internet access is 
unavailable, to get onto the network. 
But regrettably, the reforms it has adopted are unlikely to narrow 
the digital divide. The Lifeline reforms replicate many of the problems 
that have long plagued the program: the Commission has not targeted 
the subsidy to households that otherwise would not purchase Internet 
access and has offered no proof that an extra $9.25 each month would 
entice those households to buy Internet access.10 Its definition of 
qualifying broadband service is inconsistent with earlier agency 
rulings,11 and its desire to phase out telephone support is 
 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592957.pdf. 
 6 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PROPOSED THIRD QUARTER 2018 UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
CONTRIBUTION FACTOR 1 (2018) [hereinafter PROPOSED THIRD QUARTER 2018], 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-613A1.pdf. The factor has been as high 
as 19.5 % in the first quarter of 2018. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PUBLIC NOTICE: 
PROPOSED FIRST QUARTER 2018 UNIVERSAL SERVICE CONTRIBUTION FACTOR 1 (2017), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/usf-contribution-factor-1st-quarter-2018-195-percent. 
In addition to Lifeline and High-Cost support, the Universal Service Fund also spends 
$2.3 billion annually on E-rate, a program that provides Internet access to schools and 
libraries, as well as a program to provide similar access to rural healthcare facilities. 
 7 Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3986 (2016). 
 8 Connect Am. Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17673 (2011). 
 9 See infra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 155–84. 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 191–94. 
  
2018] Narrowing the Digital Divide 807 
unnecessarily paternalistic.12 Moreover, the Lifeline reforms do not 
address other, potentially more significant barriers to Internet 
adoption, such as low interest in buying household Internet access and 
the high cost of computers.13 The 2016 Lifeline Reform Order 
amounts to a $2.25 billion annual bet that giving a little bit of money 
to millions of low-income households will somehow solve the 
broadband gap. While the Connect America Fund’s reverse auction 
mechanism is a better idea, the Commission’s reforms have driven up 
the Universal Service Fund’s costs without addressing the serious 
structural flaws in the program, such as lack of congressional 
oversight and an unsustainable funding mechanism.14 
We can, and we must, do better. 
This Article argues that America’s approach to universal service 
needs revolutionary, not evolutionary, change. Rather than merely 
taking a flawed telephone program and extending it to broadband, 
Congress should design a new system to address the multifaceted 
challenges posed by the digital divide. 
For low-income consumers, Congress should adopt a 
comprehensive, consumer-focused approach that addresses multiple 
drivers of Internet non-adoption and aims to empower low-income 
families to be full-fledged participants in the telecommunications 
marketplace. This approach would encompass digital literacy outreach 
programs and low-cost equipment plans as well as monthly service 
plan subsidies. The monthly plan subsidy should be data-driven, 
targeting only those who currently lack Internet access and providing 
them with the means to secure a plan that fits the activities that we 
expect recipients to be able to complete online. Consistent with 
President Obama’s ConnectALL initiative, this subsidy should be 
direct and portable: recipients should receive the subsidy directly and 
be able to choose how best to use this credit toward the bundle of 
telecommunications services that best fit their household needs. 
For rural areas, Congress should adopt a block grant program in 
partnership with the states. The challenges to rural broadband 
construction are myriad and diverse, and the approach that works in 
flat Kansas may not be readily portable to mountainous West Virginia. 
State public utility commissions are in a better position than their 
federal counterparts to analyze the unique challenges faced by the 
 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 195–99. 
 13 See infra text accompanying notes 185–90. 
 14 See infra text accompanying notes 223–33. 
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broadband industry in each state, and to design subsidy programs 
tailored to those challenges. 
Finally, Congress should eliminate the opaque and unsustainable 
funding mechanism for universal service. The program should be 
placed on a fixed budget and subjected to congressional oversight. 
This would increase the incentive to deploy funds efficiently and 
reduce opportunities for fraud and waste that are so endemic to the 
current statutory scheme. Congress should also consider shifting the 
low-income subsidy program away from the Federal Communications 
Commission and to another agency, such as the Department of Health 
and Human Services, that better understands the drivers of poverty-
related issues. 
I. INTRODUCING UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
A. The Case for Universal Service 
The basic tenet of universal service has been a cornerstone of 
telecommunications policy for nearly a century. The 1934 
Communications Act charges the Federal Communications 
Commission to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of 
the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide 
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charges.”15 Over the years, Congress and the Commission 
have taken numerous steps to assist those who, because of geographic 
or socioeconomic difficulties, lack basic access to the nation’s 
telecommunications network. 
Economists often justify these policies by citing network effects. In 
general, the value of a network connection to a consumer generally 
increases as the number of people the consumer can reach on the 
network increases.16 A telephone network that allows two neighbors to 
call one another is somewhat useful, if they wish to speak to one 
another. But extending the network to a third neighbor enhances the 
value of that network to all three participants: the newly-added 
neighbor can now use a telephone system that he could not previously 
access, while each of the two existing members can now call twice as 
many people as before.17 A universal service policy that encourages 
 
 15 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). 
 16 See Parsons & Bixby, supra note 1, at 135-36. 
 17 See, e.g., Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6665 
(2012) (“As an initial matter, all consumers, not just low-income consumers, receive 
value from the network effects of widespread voice and broadband subscribership.”). 
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greater adoption rates benefits not only the direct recipients of 
assistance, but all other subscribers as well.18 These network effects 
distinguish universal service from many other government entitlement 
programs where the benefits to the public are less direct, and may 
make it more politically palatable.19 
Of course, like other entitlement programs, universal service also 
confers important benefits directly upon its recipients. In the 
telephone context, perhaps the most obvious (and oft-recognized) 
benefit is 911 service, assuring that recipients have rapid access to 
potentially life-saving public safety and health care services.20 But the 
benefits go far beyond simply police and fire protection. As the 
Commission has explained, “[t]hose consumers without affordable, 
quality voice services are at a disadvantage in accessing social and 
economic resources and opportunities.”21 For example, “voice service 
is particularly important for low-income consumers, who often must 
juggle multiple jobs and interviews for new employment as well as 
keep in contact with social service agencies.”22 Socially, telephone 
service allows a subscriber to keep in contact with friends and family, 
thus enhancing overall social integration. 
The case for a robust universal service program is even stronger in 
the digital age. As more of our daily activities move online, it becomes 
increasingly important to make sure that all consumers can continue 
to participate in society and benefit from the information revolution. 
These activities include: 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 546-50 (1998). Of course, these effects can be 
overstated. As Lemley and McGowan explain:  
While network theory holds that existing members of the telephone network 
will enjoy some benefit from the addition of new telephone users to the 
network . . . it does not follow that this marginal private benefit exceeds or 
equals the marginal private cost of adding new members. Nor does it mean 
that the private marginal costs and benefits will equal the costs and benefits 
to society at large, even assuming, as telephony policy has decreed, that 
society benefits as the extent of the telephone network approaches the goal 
of universal service.  
Id. at 546. 
 20 E.g., Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. at 6666 (“Voice 
service allows consumers to connect with public safety and health care resources.”). 
 21 Id. at 6665-66. 
 22 Id. at 6666. 
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• News. Internet access lowers the cost of information, 
making it easier to be an informed citizen. According to a 
recent poll, more Americans report getting their news each 
week via laptop or computer (70 percent) than via 
traditional newspapers and magazines (61 percent).23 
• Commerce. The ability to order goods online has yielded 
significant consumer benefits. Former FCC Chairman 
Tom Wheeler notes a 2012 study showing that broadband 
access helps a typical consumer save $8,800 each year by 
providing access to bargains on goods and services.24 
• Jobs. Companies are increasingly leveraging the Internet 
to identify and recruit talent. A recent study from the 
Council of Economic Advisers shows that young 
unemployed individuals who use the Internet to find jobs 
are re-employed 25 percent faster than those using only 
traditional methods.25 
• Education. Schools are increasingly integrating online 
tools in the classroom and in homework assignments. FCC 
Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel has highlighted the 
role of Internet access for schoolchildren and the need to 
avoid a “Homework Gap” for those who lack access at 
home.26 
Despite these clear benefits, almost one-third of American 
households lack high-speed Internet access at home.27 By segmenting 
this data, we can begin to understand the contours of the digital 
 
 23 How Americans Get Their News, AM. PRESS INST. (March 17, 2014, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-
americans-get-news/. 
 24 Tom Wheeler, A Lifeline for Low-Income Americans, FED. COMM. COMMISSION 
(May 28, 2015, 1:25 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/05/28/lifeline-
low-income-americans. 
 25 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
BROADBAND ACCESS 7 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
page/files/20160308_broadband_cea_issue_brief.pdf (citing Peter Kuhn & Hani 
Mansour, Is Internet Job Search Still Ineffective? 18 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (Bonn), 
Discussion Paper No. 5955, 2011), http://ftp.iza.org/dp5955.pdf). 
 26 Jessica Rosenworcel, How to Close the “Homework Gap”, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 5, 
2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article4300806.html. 
 27 JOHN B. HORRIGAN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RES. CTR., HOME BROADBAND 2015, at 
2 (2015), http:// http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2015/12/ 
Broadband-adoption-full.pdf. 
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divide. 67 percent of urban households, and 70 percent of suburban 
households, purchase broadband access each month, but only 55 
percent of rural homes do so.28 The disparity is even greater when 
segmented by income: 95 percent of households earning over 
$150,000 each year purchase broadband access, compared with only 
about half of households earning less than $25,000.29 As the Internet 
displaces the telephone as the nation’s primary telecommunications 
network, the case for modernizing our traditional universal service 
mandate to fit the twenty-first century becomes increasingly strong. 
B. Origins of the Universal Service Program 
1. Universal Service Before the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
The term “universal service” originated with legendary AT&T 
president Theodore Vail, who built the Bell System and secured a 
nationwide, state-protected telephone monopoly under the mantra of 
“one policy, one system, and universal service.”30 But as Professor Tim 
Wu has explained, Vail did not mean “universal as in, say, universal 
health care. Rather, it was something more akin to one universal 
church.”31 AT&T was the country’s largest telephone company, 
stemming from its control of Alexander Graham Bell’s original 
telephone patent.32 But it faced competition from hundreds of 
independent telephone companies that sprang up after the patent 
expired in the 1890s.33 Vail argued, ultimately successfully, that the 
country was better served by a single telephone system than by a 
multitude of small entities.34 But in exchange for a legally protected 
 
 28 Id. at 8. 
 29 Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 30 FCC Rcd. 7818, 7822, 7829 & 
n.232 (2015); see also HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 27, at 8 (noting that 90% of 
homes earning over $100,000 per year have access, compared to only 41% of homes 
earning less than $20,000 per year). 
 30 Tim Wu, The Great American Information Emperors, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2010, 10:22 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/features/2010/the_great_ 
american_information_emperors/how_theodore_vail_built_the_att_monopoly.html. 
 31 Id.; see also Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go to War: The 
U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War 
I, 91 TEX. L. REV. 983, 1042-44 (2013). 
 32 See Nina Santo, Deregulation Hang Ups: Two New Laws Should Jam 
Telecommunications “Crammers”, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 452, 454 (1999). 
 33 Id. (citing MICHAEL NOLL, INTRODUCTION TO TELEPHONES & TELEPHONE SYSTEMS 
177 (2d ed. 1991)). 
 34 See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 545 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that the structure of Bell’s monopoly was accepted 
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monopoly over telephone service in much of the United States, 
Congress and the states imposed common carriage obligations on 
AT&T: the 1934 Communications Act required the company to serve 
customers throughout its service area upon reasonable request, at just 
and reasonable rates.35 
During the Bell monopoly era, “universal service” referred to 
regulators’ efforts to manipulate the prices of various telephone 
services to serve public policy ends.36 These cross-subsidies often 
focused on keeping basic telephone service affordable for customers 
that it would not otherwise be cost-effective to service.37 For example, 
Bell charged commercial customers higher rates than residential 
customers for the same service.38 By marking up commercial service, 
Bell could reduce the price for residential service and therefore make 
telephone service more affordable for American households. Bell also 
charged similar rates to urban and rural residential customers, despite 
the fact that it cost the company more to serve rural areas.39 This rate-
averaging meant that urban customers cross-subsidized rural 
customers. Finally, state and federal regulators together allowed Bell to 
allocate a disproportionate amount of shared network costs to long-
distance service rather than local service.40 Regulators used long 
distance calls, which were considered somewhat of a luxury good, to 
cross-subsidize local service, which was considered a necessity. 
Together, these policies created artificially low local service rates for 
residential customers (particularly in rural areas), which helped low-
 
and built around by federal subsidies). 
 35 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1934); see Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and 
Federalism: Who Should Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 388 (2010). 
 36 BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 545. 
 37 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to 
Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 48-49 (2008). As new companies 
entered the market for long-distance services in the 1970s, these cross-subsidies also 
became a tool by which Bell could stifle competition. Id. at 74. 
 38 Id. 
 39 BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 546. 
 40 Id. The most explicit of these policies was known as the “Ozark Plan.” Enacted 
in 1970, the Ozark Plan “disproportionately allocated the fixed costs of the local 
telephone network to long distance traffic” by requiring that for every 1 percent of 
traffic consisting of long distance calls, 3.3 percent of local network costs would be 
covered through long distance prices. Id. at 550. So a network that carried 90 percent 
local calls and 10 percent long distance calls would allocate 67 percent of its costs 
toward local service and 33 percent of is costs to long distance service. Id.; see also 
PETER W. HUBER ET AL., 2004 Cumulative Supplement: Competition Policy and Antitrust, 
in FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 122 (2d ed. 1999). 
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income and rural customers who would be unable to afford service at 
true cost. During the monopoly era, Bell was largely agnostic about 
these cross-subsidies: the company was concerned primarily that it 
earned a reasonable rate of return overall, and was less concerned 
about where the money came from.41 
But this carefully balanced system of cross-subsidies began to 
crumble as competition displaced monopoly in portions of the 
telephone industry. Savvy entrepreneurs recognized that Bell’s 
supracompetitive profits in areas such as long-distance service 
represented potential business opportunities.42 Beginning in the late 
1960s, MCI Communications and Sprint developed alternatives to the 
AT&T long distance network, marketing their private networks to 
commercial clients who were being overcharged by the Bell 
monopoly.43 AT&T battled these upstarts, in part because these 
competitors’ cream-skimming threatened to undermine regulators’ 
cross-subsidy schemes: AT&T would still be required to serve loss-
leading rural customers but would be unable to offset those losses in 
other markets that were becoming more competitive.44 Ultimately, 
AT&T’s efforts to combat competition drew the attention of antitrust 
regulators, who sued the company in 1974, alleging that AT&T was 
leveraging its ongoing monopoly over local telephone exchanges to 
distort competition in adjacent markets in violation of the Sherman 
Act.45 That case settled with the 1984 Modified Final Judgment, which 
broke up the company into a competitive AT&T long-distance 
network and seven regional, highly regulated local telephone provider 
monopolies known as the Regional Bell Operating Companies.46 
This breakup made it impossible for regulators to maintain the 
cross-subsidies of the monopoly era, particularly given the separation 
of the long-distance network from the local exchanges.47 Indeed, the 
Modified Final Judgment’s purpose was to isolate the local telephone 
 
 41 See BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 545. 
 42 Id. at 201. 
 43 See generally Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The 
AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 12 (1983). 
 44 See BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 545; MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 43. 
 45 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982); see 
also MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 43, at 14. 
 46 See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 135 (approving the settlement). The 
Regional Bell Operating Companies were NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, 
AmeriTech, Southwestern Bell, US West, and Pacific Bell. Jared S. Dinkes, Note, 
Rethinking the Revolution: Competitive Telephony in a Voice Over Internet Protocol Era, 
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 833, 850 n.90 (2005). 
 47 See BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 550. 
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exchanges and prevent them from entering other lines of business.48 
But regulators remained dedicated to keeping the cost of residential 
local service affordable, particularly in rural areas.49 So after the 
breakup, the FCC and state regulators developed a series of implicit 
and explicit subsidies designed to recreate the traditional cross-
subsidy model within a competitive environment.50 
Implicit subsidies continued through a complicated access charge 
regime.51 While long distance providers competed against one another 
for residential customers, they could not complete their customers’ 
long-distance calls without the cooperation of an originating local 
exchange carrier (which carried the call from the calling party’s 
household to that party’s long-distance provider) and a terminating 
local exchange carrier (which carried the call from the long-distance 
network to the called party’s household).52 To secure that cooperation, 
the long-distance company paid an access charge to the originating 
and terminating local telephone exchanges.53 Because the local 
exchanges continued to be monopolies after the breakup, these access 
charges were regulated by tariffs: interstate access charges were 
regulated by the FCC and intrastate access charges by state public 
utility commissions.54 But regulators allowed these access charges to 
be set well above the local phone companies’ costs of carrying these 
calls.55 As a result, long-distance companies subsidized local phone 
company operations and passed along those costs to consumers as part 
of their long distance rates.56 And local phone companies, in turn, 
could use the subsidies to offset below-cost rates for local service.57 
The access charge regime thus replicated the monopoly-era cross-
subsidy of local service by long distance service. 
The FCC also adopted explicit subsidies to help support local 
telephone service. Following divestiture, the agency proposed a $6 per 
month subscriber line charge (“SLC”) on every local telephone service 
 
 48 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 160. 
 49 See BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 550. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See generally MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (1983) (outlining 
the structure and details of the access charge regime). 
 52 See Access Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rcd. 12962, 12965 (2000).  
 53 Dennis L. Weisman, Default Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the Transitional 
Regulatory Asymmetries in the Telecommunications Market, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 154 
(1988). 
 54 See Access Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rcd. at 12966.  
 55 Weisman, supra note 53, at 154. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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customer, the proceeds of which would help cover the local telephone 
company’s fixed costs.58 But the proposal drew significant opposition 
from Congress and state regulators, which sought to keep residential 
prices low.59 Ultimately, the agency adopted the $6 SLC on 
commercial customers and a lower $3.50/month SLC for residential 
customers.60 Concerned that even this modest rise might cause some 
low-income families to cancel telephone service, the FCC and state 
regulators in 1984 established the Lifeline Assistance Program.61 As 
amended in 1985, Lifeline provided a federally funded credit of $3.50/
month for eligible customers,62 thus effectively waiving the new SLC.63 
Lifeline-eligible households also received an additional $3.50/month 
bill credit from participating states.64 In 1987, the agency enacted Link 
Up America, a similar program designed to defray one-time 
installation costs for low-income families.65 
2. The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
Congress addressed universal service as part of its monumental 
1996 Telecommunications Act.66 Though the bulk of the Act was 
designed to manufacture competition in local telephone markets, 
section 254 contains Congress’s first explicit statutory instructions on 
universal service.67 This provision contains several guiding principles 
that have helped shape the modern Federal Universal Service Fund. 
Federalism: Perhaps most importantly, Congress instructed that 
universal service be a cooperative endeavor between the federal 
government and the states. Specifically, the Act established a Federal-
State Joint Board68 tasked with developing “policies for the 
 
 58 BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 550. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See MTS and WATS Market Structure; and Establishment of a Joint Board; 
Amendment, 50 Fed. Reg. 939, 939 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
 62 BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 34, at 550. 
 63 MTS and WATS Market Structure, 50 Fed. Reg. at 941. 
 64 See id.; see also Lynne Holt & Mark Jamison, Re-Evaluating FCC Policies 
Concerning the Lifeline and Link-Up Programs, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 393 
(2007). 
 65 See MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 2 FCC Rcd. 2953, 2955 (1987) (amendment 
of Part 67 of the Commission’s Rules & Establishment of a Joint Board). 
 66 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). 
 67 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2018). 
 68 Id. § 254(a)(1). 
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preservation and advancement of universal service.”69 The Joint Board 
is tasked with making recommendations to the Commission regarding 
universal service issues, which the Commission is required to act upon 
within one year of receipt.70 States are also permitted to adopt their 
own universal service programs that go beyond the Federal Universal 
Service Fund’s basic offerings.71 
Future-proofing: Presciently, Congress also instructed that 
“[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommunications 
services . . . taking into account advances in telecommunications and 
information technologies and services.”72 The Commission establishes 
the definition of the services supported by the program, upon 
recommendation from the Federal-State Joint Board.73 But the Act 
provides some guidelines to make that determination, including the 
extent to which such services are “essential to education, public 
health, or public safety”74 and are subscribed to by a “substantial 
majority of residential customers” through “the operation of market 
choices by customers.”75 The statute thus has safeguards to protect 
against program recipients being left behind: as innovative new 
services change consumer preferences and become mainstream, the 
Commission’s definition should shift accordingly. 
Specific Principles: Congress also outlined several specific principles 
to guide the Commission’s deliberations and the Joint Board’s 
recommendations. For example, the program should help assure that 
all consumers have access to telecommunications and information 
services, including low-income consumers and those living “in rural, 
insular, and high cost areas.”76 It also must help assure that schools, 
health care providers, and libraries have access to advanced 
telecommunications services.77 
Funding: Finally, the Act provided guidelines regarding how the 
universal service program would be funded going forward. Congress 
explained that “[t]here should be specific, predictable and sufficient 
Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal 
 
 69 Id. § 254(b). 
 70 Id. § 254(a)(1)-(2). 
 71 Id. § 254(f). 
 72 Id. § 254(c)(1). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. § 254(c)(1)(A). 
 75 Id. § 254(c)(1)(B). 
 76 Id. § 254(b)(3). 
 77 Id. § 254(b)(6). 
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service.”78 It also preferred an explicit subsidy mechanism to the 
implicit subsidies of the monopoly era,79 though courts recognized 
that it expected this transition to occur gradually rather than all at 
once.80 Specifically, Congress instructed that “[e]very 
telecommunications carrier that provides interstate 
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and 
nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient 
mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance 
universal service.”81 
C. Implementing the 1996 Act: The Federal Universal Service Fund 
Pursuant to this direction from Congress, the Joint Board proposed, 
and the Commission adopted, a comprehensive program to develop 
and serve the universal service goals identified in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. It also laid out a plan to transition the 
industry from a system of implicit cross-subsidies to an explicit 
universal subsidy funded by interstate telecommunications carriers on 
a competitively-neutral basis. In accordance with the Joint Board’s first 
proposal in 1996, the Commission established four universal service 
programs. 
1. Lifeline and Link Up 
To achieve the 1996 Act’s mandate to provide assistance to low-
income consumers, the Commission refined and expanded the Lifeline 
and Link Up programs. Lifeline-eligible households would continue to 
receive a credit on their monthly bills for local telephone service, and 
the program was expanded nationwide rather than being limited to 
participating states.82 The FCC raised the bill credit from $3.50 to 
 
 78 Id. § 254(b)(5). 
 79 See id. § 254(e); Tex. Office of the Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 
425 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We are convinced that the plain language of § 254(e) does not 
permit the FCC to maintain any implicit subsidies for universal service support.”); 
Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8783-84 (1997) 
(“Congress intended that, to the extent possible, ‘any support mechanisms continued 
or created under new section 254 should be explicit, rather than implicit as many 
support mechanisms are today.’” (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 131 (1996) 
(Conf. Rep.))). 
 80 See, e.g., Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 309 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (noting that “there is no time limit on realization of the reform” to transition to 
explicit support mechanisms).  
 81 47 U.S.C. § 254(d). 
 82 Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. at 8957, 8960-61, 8963. 
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$5.25 and de-linked the credit from the SLC.83 Link Up offered a one-
time bill credit of up to $30 to eligible households for the cost of 
initiating telephone service.84 Households could establish eligibility for 
both programs by showing household income below 135 percent of 
the national poverty line or by proving enrollment in one of several 
other government anti-poverty programs.85 States would be 
responsible for verifying individual household eligibility.86 Upon 
application, the Federal Universal Service Fund would reimburse 
telecommunications carriers for these bill credits.87 
Over the next two decades, these low-income assistance programs 
expanded in response to changing market conditions. The 
Commission ultimately raised the Lifeline subsidy from $5.25 to $9.25 
per month, reflecting rising costs of telecommunications service.88 In 
2008 the Commission expanded Lifeline to include wireless providers 
as an alternative to traditional landline providers, as long as the 
consumer did not exceed one Lifeline subsidy per household.89 The 
subsidy is not paid to consumers, but is instead paid to 
telecommunications carriers, who verify individual customers’ 
eligibility and apply to the fund for reimbursement of the subsidy 
amount.90 
 
 83 Id. at 8963. 
 84 See id. at 8959. 
 85 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7818, 7873 
(2015); Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3965 
(2016). The list of programs to determine eligibility has fluctuated slightly since 1997, 
but includes programs such as Medicaid, food stamps/TANF relief, and Section 8 
housing assistance. Id. at 4021.  
 86 Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. at 8975. 
 87 Id. at 8971. 
 88 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6663 
(2012) (“Lifeline now provides a discount to non-Tribal subscribers averaging $9.25 
per month for telephone charges . . . .”). Residents in federally-recognized tribal lands 
are eligible for an additional $25 per month in assistance. See Rob Frieden, Killing 
with Kindness: Fatal Flaws in the $6.5 Billion Universal Service Funding Mission and 
What Should Be Done to Narrow the Digital Divide, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 
458 (2006). 
 89 See, e.g., Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 23 FCC 
Rcd. 6206, 6207, 6210, 6214-15 (2008). 
 90 See Verify Subscriber Eligibility, USAC, http://www.usac.org/li/program-
requirements/verify-eligibility/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018) for an explanation of the 
eligibility verification process. 
  
2018] Narrowing the Digital Divide 819 
2. The High Cost Fund 
Following the 1996 Act’s instruction that “rural, insular, and high 
cost areas should have access to telecommunications services,”91 the 
Commission established the High Cost Fund. Building on a smaller 
pre-1996 program, the High Cost Fund provided direct financial 
support to telecommunications providers in areas “where local rates 
would otherwise be unaffordable for some consumers.”92 As Rob 
Frieden explains, the fund subsidized carriers “in areas where the cost 
of providing service exceeds a national or state average by at least 115 
to 135 percent, depending on the type of cost elements supported.”93 
Because of low population density in these areas, these 
telecommunications providers have fewer customers per mile of 
network than their counterparts in urban and suburban areas, and 
therefore a smaller customer base from which to recover the costs of 
installing and maintaining the network.94 The Joint Board was 
concerned that if the price of telephone service rose to cover those 
costs, some consumers may not be able to afford the higher rate. The 
purpose of the High Cost Fund was to cover some of those fixed costs, 
so fewer costs would be passed along to consumers and therefore rates 
in high cost areas would approximate those in more densely populated 
areas.95 
3. E-rate and Rural Health Care Program 
The Commission enacted the E-rate program to fulfill the 1996 Act’s 
mandate to support advanced telecommunications and information 
services in the nation’s schools and libraries.96 Unlike Lifeline and the 
High-Cost Fund, E-rate was designed from the beginning to include 
Internet access as well as traditional telephone service.97 Depending on 
the demographics of the community (including whether it is in an 
urban or rural area), E-rate reimburses local governments for 20 to 90 
 
 91 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2018). 
 92 See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. at 8787. 
 93 Frieden, supra note 88, at 459. 
 94 Frieden notes that many recipients of high-cost support served fewer than 
50,000 telephone lines each. Id. 
 95 See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in 
Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307, 342 
(2003). 
 96 See Modernizing the E-Rate Program for Sch. & Libraries, 29 FCC Rcd. 8870, 
8875 (2014) (detailing the history of E-Rate). 
 97 See id. 
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percent of the costs of providing E-rate supported services in covered 
institutions.98 Through E-rate, the Commission sought to provide a 
point of Internet contact in each community and to help the nation’s 
educational system take advantage of the digital revolution.99 
The Rural Health Care Program is the smallest of the four federal 
universal service programs. It subsidizes telecommunications service 
so that rural health care facilities pay rates comparable to their urban 
counterparts.100 Like E-rate, the program has long reimbursed for the 
costs of both traditional telephone service and Internet access.101 The 
program has been a catalyst for telemedicine, a suite of Internet-based 
products that help rural hospitals access advanced medical services 
and specialists located in urban institutions. 
4. Contribution Mechanism 
Finally, pursuant to Congressional directive to replace the 
patchwork collection of implicit and explicit subsidies with “specific, 
predictable, and sufficient Federal and state mechanisms to preserve 
and advance universal service,” the Commission adopted a 
revolutionary new funding mechanism.102 Each quarter, eligible 
telecommunications carriers report to the Universal Service 
Administrative Company (to which the Commission has delegated 
day-to-day administration of the fund)103 the anticipated subsidies 
they expect to receive from the Universal Service Fund.104 All 
interstate carriers are also required to report their expected quarterly 
revenue from interstate and international telecommunications 
services.105 From these figures, the Commission calculates a Federal 
Universal Fund Surcharge that each carrier must pay to support the 
fund. Carriers are permitted to pass this cost on to customers on their 
monthly bills.106 
 
 98 Frieden, supra note 88, at 459-60. 
 99 See Modernizing the E-Rate Program for Sch. & Libraries, 29 FCC Rcd. at 8875. 
 100 Frieden, supra note 88, at 460. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Tex. Office of the Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 406 (5th Cir. 
1999) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254 (b)(5) (2018)). 
 103 47 C.F.R. § 54.701(a) (2018). 
 104 Id. § 54.709(a) (2018). 
 105 Id. The Commission initially sought to assess all telecommunications revenue of 
interstate telecommunications providers, but the court found that assessment of 
intrastate revenue exceeded the Commission’s authority. See Tex. Office of the Pub. 
Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 409. 
 106 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, UNIVERSAL SERVICE SUPPORT MECHANISMS CONSUMER 
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D. Transitioning the Universal Service Fund to the Digital Age 
While the bulk of the 1996 Telecommunications Act focused on 
telephone regulation, Congress also charged the Commission with 
monitoring and encouraging broadband development. Specifically, 
section 706 requires the Commission to “encourage the deployment 
on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications 
capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and 
secondary schools and classrooms).”107 To fulfill this obligation, the 
Commission must regularly conduct inquiries to “determine whether 
advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all 
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.”108 
In 2009, the Commission leveraged this annual reporting mandate 
to launch a comprehensive overview of broadband deployment in 
America.109 The resulting 376-page report, the 2010 National 
Broadband Plan, served as a fulcrum to shift the Commission’s 
attention decisively toward broadband networks.110 The report 
described broadband as “the great infrastructure challenge of the 21st 
century,” an engine for growth “[l]ike electricity a century ago.”111 
The report provided a comprehensive overview of the broadband 
marketplace and outlined several potential government initiatives to 
encourage broadband deployment and uptake. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report encouraged the Commission to 
migrate the Universal Service Fund away from telephone service and 
toward broadband.112 It outlined an ambitious plan to ensure all 
Americans have access to broadband by 2020.113 Although the 
Commission did not ultimately enact all of the National Broadband 
 
GUIDE 1 (2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/universalservice.pdf. 
 107 47 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1996) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2018)). 
 108 Id. § 706(b) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2018)). The Act defines 
“advanced telecommunications capability” as “without regard to any transmission 
media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications 
capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, 
and video telecommunications using any technology.” Id. § 706(c) (current version at 
47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2018)). 
 109 Inquiry into the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams., 
24 FCC Rcd. 10505, 10505 (2009). 
 110 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 
(2010) [hereinafter CONNECTING AMERICA], https://transition.fcc.gov/national-
broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.  
 111 Id. at xi. 
 112 See id. at xi, xiii, 10, 136. 
 113 See id. at 135-36. 
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Plan’s recommendations, it initiated a process whereby the fund 
shifted slowly but definitively toward providing broadband service. 
1. Lifeline Reforms 
Citing the National Broadband Plan,114 the Commission began 
slowly to expand Lifeline to support broadband access. A 2012 order 
established a goal of “ensuring the availability of broadband service for 
low-income consumers.”115 The order recognized that “availability” 
requires both that broadband service be both accessible and 
affordable.116 Initially, the Commission desired to increase broadband 
penetration rates for low-income consumers so they matched 
penetration rates of the next-highest income bracket.117 The order 
created an eighteen-month pilot program to test the effectiveness of 
various subsidy levels.118 The Commission also invited comment on 
whether to allow the existing subsidy to be credited toward a wireless 
plan that bundled voice and mobile broadband service.119 
A 2016 order120 brought more sweeping changes to the Lifeline 
program. The Commission recognized that “the Internet has become a 
prerequisite to full and meaningful participation in society.”121 But 
while “the importance of broadband grows,” the Commission noted 
that 64.5 million people remain without an Internet connection.122 A 
disproportionate share of this population comes from low-income 
households like those that Lifeline was designed to serve.123 Citing 
section 254’s mandate that “consumers in all regions of the nation, 
including low-income consumers . . . should have access to 
telecommunications and information services”124 and that universal 
service is “an evolving level of telecommunications services,”125 the 
Commission reoriented Lifeline toward broadband. 
 
 114 See id. at 10 (“To promote affordability, this plan also proposes extending 
the Lifeline and Link-Up programs to support broadband.”). 
 115 Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6673 (2012). 
 116 Id. at 6674. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Id. at 6795. 
 119 See id. at 6793. 
 120 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962 (2016). 
 121 Id. at 3963. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 3972 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1)(3) (2016)). 
 125 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(c) (2016)). 
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The 2016 order officially added broadband access as a Lifeline-
supported service.126 Therefore eligible participants were now able to 
use their $9.25 monthly subsidy toward the purchase of either voice or 
standalone broadband service.127 This revision was explicitly 
technologically neutral, so the subsidy could be used to purchase 
broadband from a fixed or mobile provider.128 
The order also established a gradual transition away from voice 
service. Over a five-and-one-half year period, the Commission will 
gradually decrease the subsidy for voice-only service from $9.25 to 
$7.25 and then to $5.25 per month.129 During this transition period, 
the full $9.25/month benefit will be available for any plan that 
includes broadband access.130 To assure that Lifeline recipients are not 
left behind as networks improve, the Commission mandated that the 
subsidy would be available only for plans offering speeds that at least 
70 percent of Americans subscribe to. By December 2021, Lifeline 
subsidies will no longer be available for voice-only service, and the 
program will from then on support only plans that include broadband 
access.131 
2. High-Cost Fund and Intercarrier Compensation Reform 
The National Broadband Plan also recommended significant efforts 
to boost broadband deployment. The report explained there were 
fourteen million people who simply had no access to broadband 
service. It estimated that $24 billion in additional funding would be 
required to close this broadband availability gap.132 The report noted 
then-current efforts by Congress to fund new network buildout 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which 
appropriated $7.2 billion toward new broadband construction efforts, 
overseen by the Commerce Department and the Department of 
Agriculture.133 As a next step, the plan recommended that the 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 3979-81. 
 128 Id. at 3980-81. 
 129 See id. at 3986. 
 130 See id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 110, at 136. This 
figure was calculated by estimating initial capex costs to deploy these networks, plus 
the ongoing costs to operate these networks, minus expected revenue these new 
networks would receive, discounted back to 2010 dollars. See id. at 136-37. 
 133 Id. at 138-39. This one-time grant was part of the so-called “stimulus bill” 
designed to counteract the Great Recession. See id. at 138. It funded the Broadband 
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Commission initiate the transition of the High-Cost Fund away from 
voice service and toward broadband deployment.134 
The Commission responded with a comprehensive, 752-page order 
in 2011 that created a two-phase plan to jumpstart the fund’s 
broadband subsidy efforts.135 In phase I, the agency froze all existing 
High-Cost support to most telephone companies. For price-cap 
carriers, a category that included most High-Cost Fund recipients, the 
Commission conditioned future support upon recipient companies 
offering broadband service alongside traditional voice service.136 For 
rate-of-return carriers, companies that serve the most rural areas and 
comprise 5 percent of telephone companies but roughly 50 percent of 
High-Cost Fund expenditures, the Commission required only that 
recipient companies make broadband service available upon 
reasonable customer request.137 
The order also created two new funds dedicated to spur broadband 
deployment. The first, the Connect America Fund, is dedicated to 
providing targeted, efficient support for broadband buildout.138 The 
second is the Mobility Fund, which is focused specifically upon 
promoting the universal availability of mobile voice and broadband 
service.139 In Phase I, each fund received an immediate $300 million 
infusion to be dedicated to building broadband in unserved areas, to 
be awarded via a reverse auction process.140 In Phase II, the Mobility 
Fund would receive $500 million in annual support to “expand and 
sustain mobile voice and broadband services in communities in which 
service would be unavailable absent federal support.”141 Also during 
Phase II, the Commission would launch a five-year plan to reduce 
legacy High-Cost Fund support and instead shift those funds to 
promote fixed broadband instead.142 
 
Telecommunications Opportunities Program, a Commerce Department initiative that 
provided grants for “for deploying broadband infrastructure in unserved and 
underserved areas in the United States, enhancing broadband capabilities at public 
computer centers, and promoting sustainable broadband adoption projects.” Id. at 
139. The Agriculture Department’s Broadband Initiatives Program provided grants and 
loans to facilitate broadband deployment in rural areas. Id.  
 134 See id. at 141-42. 
 135 See In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1039 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 136 See id.  
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. at 1040. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1040 (quoting Connect Am. Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, ¶ 28 (2011)). 
 142 See id. at 1080. 
  
2018] Narrowing the Digital Divide 825 
The order contained a multiyear roadmap to transition High-Cost 
Fund support to the Connect America Fund instead. For price cap 
carriers, the order froze their support at 2011 levels and planned to 
create a model that would determine, on a census-block level, the 
amount of support needed to build and maintain a broadband 
network.143 The incumbent price-cap carrier would have the right of 
first refusal for this support, in exchange for agreeing to provide 
service throughout each census block.144 If it refused, then the 
territory would be subjected to a reverse auction, with the winning 
bidder assuming the buildout responsibilities.145 Over time, legacy 
High-Cost Fund support will be reduced in favor of the new Connect 
America Fund.146 For rate-of-return carriers, the order restricted 
reimbursement for general expenses, capped support at no more than 
$3000 per line annually, and limited support for carriers whose 
consumer prices fell below a price floor.147 
Finally, the order comprehensively overhauled the vestigial implicit 
subsidies that occurred via the intercarrier compensation regime. 
Since the 1996 Act, the Commission had undertaken various 
proceedings to combat arbitrage opportunities created by the existing 
regime.148 Recognizing that the intercarrier compensation regime was 
both anachronistic and ripe for abuse, the Commission outlined a 
multiyear plan to shift toward a “bill-and-keep” regime wherein 
telephone networks exchanged traffic for free rather than seeking 
 
 143 See Connect Am. Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, ¶¶ 22-24 (2011). 
 144 Id. ¶¶ 24, 164. 
 145 Id. ¶ 299. 
 146 See id. ¶¶ 164, 180. 
 147 See id. ¶ 26. 
 148 For example, under the Commission’s “calling party pays” rule for reciprocal 
compensation, a local telephone company that originated a local call was required to 
compensate the competing local telephone company that terminated the call. See 47 
U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (2018). This compensation was supposed to be set at cost, but it 
appeared to be an unintentional profit center for terminating LECs. During dial-up 
era, LECs competed to provide local telephone service to ISPs such as America Online, 
because this would drive significant inbound traffic with little or no outbound traffic 
in return. This competition distorted local markets enough that the Commission 
eventually removed so-called “ISP-Bound Traffic” from the intercarrier compensation 
regime completely. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(remanding agency order for further proceeding but declining to vacate); 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 
16 FCC Rcd. 9151, 9152-53 (2001). Similarly, attempts by rural LECs to exploit 
access charges — the rates that local telephone companies charged interexchange 
carriers to terminate interstate long-distance calls, which the Commission consciously 
set above cost — led to an order prohibiting arbitrage via “traffic pumping.” See 
Connect Am. Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, ¶ 995 (2011). 
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compensation from one another based on call volume.149 The 
Commission recognized that this would pose financial difficulties for 
rural and other high-cost carriers that were historically dependent 
upon these transfers to cover fixed costs, and directed these carriers to 
instead seek financial relief directly from the Universal Service Fund 
and from state public utility commissions.150 
The order was subject to multiple legal challenges, which were 
consolidated before the Tenth Circuit. In a 361-page opinion, the 
court upheld the Commission’s authority to shift the fund toward 
broadband support, finding that the Communications Act provided 
support for the agency’s decision.151 It also dismissed various 
challenges that the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.152 
Thus by 2016, the Commission had begun following through on the 
reforms outlined by the National Broadband Plan. Guided by 
Congress’s instruction that universal service should be “an evolving 
level of telecommunications,”153 the Commission began the massive 
task of redirecting the Universal Service Fund’s support system away 
from the telephone network of the twentieth century and instead 
toward the fixed and mobile broadband networks of the near future. 
II. CRITICIZING UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
Although the desire to narrow the digital divide is unquestionably a 
laudatory one, perhaps the most surprising aspect of this transition is 
how small the Commission dared to dream. The Commission never 
asked, in a vacuum, what policy initiatives it could take to improve 
broadband availability and adoption. Instead, it asked how it might 
reorient the existing telephone-based fund to focus on broadband 
instead. This is perhaps unsurprising, given both the agency’s 
statutory mandate and the reality of the existing fund programs. But it 
meant the Commission did not sufficiently reflect on the flaws in the 
existing universal service regime, nor did it ask whether programs 
designed to support the telephone network would translate well into 
broadband programs. The result was a missed opportunity to correct 
the many flaws in the existing system, and instead created a risk that 
 
 149 In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 150 See id. at 1097. 
 151 See generally id. 
 152 Id. at 1098. 
 153 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1) (2018). 
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the Commission would repeat those flaws and perpetuate them for 
another generation. 
A. Lifeline 
Lifeline demonstrates perhaps the most obvious example of 
duplicating what the agency did in the telephone context, without 
critically evaluating whether that duplication will actually narrow the 
digital divide. At a high level, the Lifeline Reform Order constitutes a 
phased transition of the $9.25 monthly subsidy from telephone service 
to broadband service.154 But the order simply assumed that this 
additional funding would reduce the broadband gap, without offering 
any evidence to support this assertion. And this lack of rigor is 
especially problematic given that critics have been asking the same 
question for decades about the program’s effectiveness in telephone 
markets. 
1. The Commission Has Not Shown the Subsidy Will Be Effective 
Despite the longevity of the Lifeline program, the Commission has 
never shown that the existing subsidy has any effect on telephone 
adoption rates. The GAO, which monitors federal spending and 
performance, has repeatedly criticized the program on these 
grounds.155 As noted above, Lifeline developed as a political 
compromise following the breakup of the Bell monopoly, stemming 
from a concern that some consumers may not be able to afford the $6/
month Subscriber Line Charge that the Commission proposed to 
replace lost cross-subsidy revenue.156 But the Commission never 
studied whether this concern was valid, viz., whether the new SLC 
charge would in fact cause low-income consumers to cancel their 
telephone service.157 Nor does the Commission know whether the 
Lifeline subsidy has meaningfully increased telephone adoption rates, 
a fact it freely admitted to the GAO.158 
 
 154 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6658 
(2012). 
 155 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROVED MANAGEMENT CAN ENHANCE 
FCC DECISION MAKING FOR THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND LOW-INCOME PROGRAM 26-28 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC SHOULD 
EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIFELINE PROGRAM 15-335 (2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 REPORT]. 
 156 See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2015 REPORT, supra note 155, at 14. 
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In fact, the studies cited by the Commission to the GAO suggest the 
opposite: they suggest that demand for telephone service is relatively 
insensitive to changes in price or income, and therefore the subsidy 
does not significantly affect consumer behavior.159 A 2013 study by 
Olga Ukhaneva found that only one in eight households that receive 
Lifeline subscribes to telephone service because of the subsidy.160 This 
suggests that 88 percent of Lifeline dollars are wasted on households 
at little risk of losing telephone service absent the subsidy — and 
Ukhaneva argues that the rate is even higher for wireless Lifeline 
recipients.161 Similarly, a 2014 study estimated that the subsidy 
increased telephone penetration rates among poor households by only 
6.1 percentage points, to a total of 91.5 percent of households.162 
Reviewing these studies, the GAO concluded that Lifeline “may be a 
rather inefficient and costly mechanism to increase telephone 
subscribership among low-income households.”163 
Other scholars have similarly suggested that Lifeline has a small 
overall impact on telephone penetration rates. David Gabel and 
Carolyn Gideon found that Lifeline had no statistically significant 
impact on declining penetration rates between 2003 and 2005.164 The 
authors found that Link-Up was statistically significant, though in the 
wrong direction: increases in Link-Up enrollment were associated with 
decreasing penetration rates, which the authors hypothesize may stem 
from greater use of Link-Up in states where overall penetration rates 
are lower.165 They also found that changing the total amount of USF 
support per household had no statistically significant effect on overall 
penetration rates.166 
One potential explanation for this result could be that price 
elasticity of telephone service is low, meaning that price is not a 
significant indicator of whether a household will contract for service. 
 
 159 See id. at 14 (citing Olga Ukhaneva, Universal Service in a Wireless World 
(Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2430713 (presented at the 42d Research Conference on Communication, 
Information and Internet Policy)); Daniel A. Ackerberg et al., Estimating the Impact of 
Low-Income Universal Service Programs, 37 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 84 (2014). 
 160 See Olga Ukhaneva, Universal Service in a Wireless World 1 (Sept. 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2430713. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See Ackerberg et al., supra note 159, at 86. 
 163 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2015 REPORT, supra note 155, at 14. 
 164 Carolyn Gideon & David Gabel, Disconnecting: Understanding Decline in 
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Numerous studies have made this point over the years, including a 
2000 Brookings Institution study by Robert Crandall and Leonard 
Waverman.167 This conclusion is also supported by the fact that only 
about one-third of eligible households participate in Lifeline, yet low-
income penetration rates remain above 90 percent.168 Other studies 
suggest that connection charges and predictability of bills are far more 
likely to be statistically significant indicators of whether a household 
signs up for or cancels service.169 If true, this would suggest that rather 
than deploying Lifeline subsidies to reduce monthly bills, the 
Commission should focus on defraying startup costs (like the now-
defunct Link-Up program did) and focus on consumer protection 
initiatives to mitigate cancellations due to monthly bill shock. 
Of course, broadband service may be more elastic than telephone 
service, meaning a monthly price subsidy may be more effective on 
broadband penetration rates than telephone rates. But the Lifeline 
reform order does not discuss the price elasticity of broadband. 
Instead the order discusses the importance of broadband to modern 
consumers and establishes the existence of a digital divide — 
conclusions few would dispute — then cites consumer surveys 
suggesting that consumers view cost as an important barrier to 
adoption.170 It offers little discussion of these surveys and does not 
explain their methodologies or reliability. Thus the agency has offered 
little reason to conclude that extending Lifeline to broadband will 
measurably close the low-income broadband gap. 
Moreover, even assuming that price is a significant barrier to 
adoption, the order fails to show that a $9.25 monthly subsidy is the 
appropriate amount to entice significant numbers of unconnected 
households to purchase broadband service. The GAO recommended 
that before expanding Lifeline to include broadband, the Commission 
conduct an assessment of low-income households’ telecommunications 
needs, which would help the agency “effectively target funds based on 
 
 167 ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE? 
WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT 91 (2000); see also Christopher 
Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson Jr., Universal Telecommunication Service: A World 
Perspective, 17 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 495, 505 (2005). 
 168 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3982 n. 
145 (2016) (“[T]he telephone penetration rate in the United States for low-income 
groups is well over [ninety] percent, meaning millions of Lifeline eligible consumers 
are still obtaining voice service without Lifeline.”).  
 169 See, e.g., Milton L. Mueller, Universal Service from the Bottom Up: A Study of 
Telephone Penetration in Camden, New Jersey, 3 INFO. SOC’Y 273, 289-90 (1996). 
 170 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. at 3963, 3968. 
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data-driven information.”171 The Commission ignored this advice, 
instead simply adopting the same level of support for broadband that 
Lifeline provides for telephone service.172 Even if one assumes without 
evidence that this subsidy convinces low-income households to buy 
telephone service, there is no logical reason to conclude that the same 
amount would also compel unconnected homes to purchase Internet 
access, which is typically more expensive than phone service. Without 
conducting a study to determine the factors driving low adoption rates, 
the Commission cannot conclude that offering $9.25 per month to 
thirteen million households will boost adoption rates more than offering 
a larger amount to a smaller number of households: for example, $46.25 
per month to 2.6 million recipients, which would cost the same amount 
of money.173 
In fact, what little data the Commission has generated suggests that 
a small monthly subsidy is unlikely to boost broadband adoption rates. 
From 2012 to 2014, the agency conducted a series of broadband 
subsidy pilot programs.174 The agency estimated that 74,000 low-
income consumers would receive broadband service through these 
trials, but in fact only one-tenth of this number was enticed to sign up, 
despite extensive outreach efforts.175 While the resulting small sample 
sizes and methodological flaws in the pilots’ design limits the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the data,176 the Commission noted 
a preliminary finding that the highest participation rates came from 
those programs offering deeply discounted or free monthly rates.177 
For example, one project offering a choice between: (1) a plan with an 
upfront cost and no monthly fee and (2) a plan with a $20 monthly fee 
saw 100 percent of plan participants enroll in the free option.178 The 
draw of free or nearly free service is consistent with the Commission’s 
experience with telephone-based Lifeline, which saw enrollment spike 
 
 171 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2010 REPORT, supra note 155, at 42. 
 172 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. at 4002. 
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when the Commission allowed recipients to purchase a free wireless 
plan rather than a subsidized landline service.179 
It is possible for broadband providers to make qualifying plans 
available at little or no out-of-pocket cost to Lifeline households. 
Comcast, for example, has offered its fifteen megabits per second 
(Mbps) Internet Essentials plan to certain families with at least one 
child on the National School Lunch Program for only $9.95 per 
month.180 But it is worth noting that Comcast adopted this program as 
one of many concessions to secure regulatory approval of its 2011 
acquisition of NBC/Universal.181 It is also limited, as existing Comcast 
customers are ineligible (which makes sense if the purpose is to 
narrow the digital divide by reaching only unserved households).182 
Other broadband providers do not offer similar programs, and entry-
level broadband service tends to be higher priced: the Commission 
reports that average advertised rates for a fifteen to twenty-five Mbps 
plan was $59.51 in 2014.183 If Lifeline focuses primarily upon plans 
that require a significant monthly payment from the consumer in 
addition to the monthly $9.25 subsidy, this data suggests that the 
subsidy is unlikely to entice unconnected households to come online 
and instead most of the money will flow to low-income households 
that are already connected.184 
2. The Lifeline Subsidy Is Incomplete 
Moreover, the 2016 Lifeline reform does little to address the 
numerous other drivers of the low-income broadband gap. According 
to the latest Pew Research Center survey, only about one-third of 
unconnected users cite monthly cost as the most important reason for 
 
 179 As the Commission noted, some of this increase stemmed from rampant fraud 
and abuse within the Lifeline program prompted by the difficulty of enforcing the 
one-subsidy-per-household limit on wireless plans. See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & 
Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3970 (2016). 
 180 See Get to Know Internet Essentials from Comcast, XFINITY, https://www.xfinity. 
com/support/articles/comcast-broadband-opportunity-program (last visited Sept. 25, 
2018).  
 181 See Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., 26 
FCC Rcd. 4238, 4242 (2011). 
 182 See Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-based Broadband 
Pricing, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 28 (2013). Former Comcast customers with past due 
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 183 See Int’l Comparison Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, 31 FCC Rcd. 2667, 2678 (2016). 
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choosing not to sign up for broadband access.185 While, as the 
Commission noted,186 this is the most-commonly cited factor, it is far 
from being the only driver cited by respondents. Moreover, for the 20 
percent of Americans who have never had Internet access, the vast 
majority (70 percent of that group) is uninterested in subscribing at 
any price.187 Larry Downes of Forbes Magazine has studied the 
evolution of the Pew survey over time and notes that many in this 
never-connected group cite relevance or usability as reasons not to 
adopt broadband.188 This result suggests that a comprehensive Lifeline 
approach should include digital literacy outreach and other initiatives 
to make Internet access more attractive and less of a mystery — 
initiatives that are missing in the current proposal. 
Ten percent of Pew respondents cited the high cost of computer 
equipment as a barrier to broadband adoption,189 which highlights a 
key distinction between telephone and broadband subsidy programs. 
Traditional telephones are fairly inexpensive, and the market has 
developed tools to allow consumers to finance more expensive 
wireless handsets over time. But there is not a similar program in place 
for home computer equipment.190 This means that the consumer faces 
a potentially significant upfront cost to cross the digital divide, a factor 
that the Lifeline telephone program never struggled with. A subsidized 
monthly plan is worthless to a consumer who lacks the hardware to 
get online. The Lifeline reform does little to address these other 
drivers of the digital divide, which limits its overall effectiveness at 
reaching and converting non-adopters. 
The order’s minimum service threshold also raises potential 
questions about the efficacy of the program. The order requires 
qualifying fixed plans to offer at least ten Mbps download speed and a 
minimum of 150 GB per month.191 This service falls short of the 
twenty-five Mbps minimum that the FCC has defined as “broadband 
service,” meaning that the agency proposes to offer low-income 
 
 185 See HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 27, at 4. 
 186 Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 3963 (2016). 
 187 See HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 27, at 6; Larry Downes, Smartphones Are 
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consumers plans that, in other contexts, it has determined to be 
inadequate to meet consumer needs.192 Then-Commissioner, now 
Chairman Ajit Pai criticized the order for this discrepancy, which he 
described as “consign[ing] Lifeline consumers to second-class digital 
status for the foreseeable future.”193 One can perhaps justify this 
choice by proving that, contrary to Chairman Pai’s assertion, ten Mbps 
is sufficient to allow eligible recipients to participate meaningfully in 
cyberspace. But the proposal does not make this argument. Instead it 
states simply that ten Mbps is the thirtieth percentile of consumer-
subscribed speeds, meaning it is what a substantial majority of 
consumers receive.194 Absent a more data-driven explanation, the 
inconsistency between the ten Mbps minimum for Lifeline and the 
twenty-five Mbps minimum used elsewhere raises questions about the 
program’s goals. 
3. The Lifeline Subsidy Is Unnecessarily Paternalistic 
Also concerning is the plan to phase out the existing, and popular, 
subsidy for mobile phone service. Support for mobile phone service 
will continue only until 2019, after which mobile plans must include a 
broadband component to be eligible for the subsidy.195 This seems 
unnecessarily paternalistic: as noted above, the Pew survey suggests 
that a substantial majority of consumers who have never purchased 
broadband access say they are unlikely to do so at any price.196 One 
can imagine a variety of potential consumer profiles within this group 
— for example, impoverished senior citizens who lack interest in 
Internet access but who value basic mobile telephone service to 
communicate easily with family and friends. As noted above, the 2008 
expansion of Lifeline to include mobile voice service was incredibly 
popular, helping drive a 166 percent increase in Lifeline subscribers 
from 2008 to 2012.197 The GAO estimates that wireless carriers 
received 85 percent of all Lifeline disbursements in the third quarter of 
2014.198 These plans are popular in part because they involve little or 
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no monthly contribution from the consumer, thus mirroring the 
results of the 2012 broadband pilot programs.199 Replacing this 
standalone mobile service with a presumably more expensive bundled 
voice/broadband offering, while holding the subsidy amount constant, 
is likely to drive up consumer out-of-pocket costs and may reduce 
Lifeline participation rates. 
Figure 1. Lifeline Program Quarterly Subscribers and Revenue, 2008-
2014 
 
Ultimately, the 2016 Lifeline Reform Order will spend $2.25 billion 
or more annually to expand a troubled telephone subsidy program 
into cyberspace, hoping that some of this money will measurably 
increase low-income broadband adoption rates. But the Commission 
has no proof that this is likely — and significant evidence suggests 
otherwise. 
B. Connect America Fund 
In many ways, the transformation of the High-Cost Fund into the 
Connect America Fund reflected a more comprehensive reform effort 
 
 199 See supra text accompanying notes 172–77. 
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than the 2016 Lifeline Order. While the thrust of the reform is similar 
— cap the existing support for telephone service and slowly transition 
these funds to support broadband networks instead — the 
Commission appears to have heeded some of the criticism of the 
telephone regime. Nonetheless, the Commission’s execution of the 
Connect America Fund initiative demonstrates several flaws that 
undermine the efficiency of the program. 
1. The Commission Has Not Shown the Subsidy Will Be Effective 
Like Lifeline, the Connect America Fund contains no significant 
measure of the effectiveness of the subsidy. This has long been a 
critique of the traditional High-Cost Fund. One study, for example, 
suggested that telephone penetration rates would fall by only 0.5 
percent if the fund were eliminated completely.200 Admittedly, the 
Connect America Fund order took several steps designed to improve 
program efficiency, such as eliminating the problematic identical 
support rule and terminating support in areas where an unsubsidized 
carrier completely overlaps the service territory of a subsidized 
carrier.201 And it has begun collecting carrier data on funding, build-
out progress, and the service quality and speed of subsidized carriers’ 
broadband plans.202 But the order lacks a data-analysis plan that would 
examine this data to determine whether the fund’s activities are 
successful.203 The Commission proposes to measure improvement in 
broadband availability by measuring the number of new homes wired 
per CAF dollars spent.204 But this simplistic analysis confuses 
correlation with causation, for as Thomas Hazlett and Scott Wallsten 
note, “broadband availability may increase for multiple reasons, some 
of which will have nothing to do with the Connect America Fund. It 
would therefore be inappropriate to automatically attribute any 
increases to the subsidy without some sort of rigorous evaluation 
mechanism.”205 
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Related to this concern, the program lacks transparency about how 
recipient companies use their subsidy dollars. The GAO has criticized 
the Commission for failing to ask carriers how High-Cost Fund 
subsidies are actually spent.206 Wallsten shows that almost 60 percent 
of High-Cost Fund dollars go to “general and administrative 
expenses,” corporate overhead costs such as planning, government 
relations, and personnel — expenses that do not directly contribute to 
network construction.207 This is perhaps unsurprising: HCF subsidies 
were traditionally awarded on a cost-plus basis, giving carriers an 
incentive to inflate costs.208 Hazlett argues that this is one reason why, 
as he proves, rural carriers tend to have higher overhead rates than 
non-rural carriers.209 Phase II of the Connect America Fund addresses 
this problem somewhat, by replacing cost-plus funding with either an 
amount determined by Commission modeling or a reverse-auction 
mechanism.210 
More generally, as with Lifeline reforms, the Commission has 
rushed to transfer funding to broadband networks, without 
conducting a study of the drivers of the broadband availability gap. 
There is a wide range of potential explanations why broadband is not 
available in a particular area, including geography, local consumer 
purchasing power, and overall demographics. The subsidy would be 
more effective if the Commission studied these drivers, determined 
which are most significant, and targeted subsidies to address those. 
Moreover, these drivers likely differ from location to location, 
meaning a single economic model is unlikely to be applicable 
nationwide. 
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2. The Subsidy Is Not Technologically Neutral 
The Connect America Fund also favors incumbent carriers over 
rivals, which can dampen the effectiveness of the subsidy. This 
preference is perhaps understandable in Phase I, because of the need 
to transition from legacy voice service with minimum disruption to 
consumers. But in Phase II, this preference is less justifiable. The long-
term goal of the program should be to bring broadband service to as 
many Americans as possible with minimal cost. In at least some 
locations, a technology other than incumbent wired broadband may be 
the most efficient way to serve an unserved area. 
In the traditional pay television market, for example, it was the 
advent of direct broadcast satellite service by providers such as 
DirecTV and Dish Network that brought pay television to rural areas 
that were uneconomical to serve by traditional cable.211 Similarly, 
satellite broadband may serve hard-to-reach areas more effectively 
than a traditional incumbent. The Commission has noted that satellite 
“is nearly universally available and can serve any given household.”212 
Historically, satellite service suffers latency and capacity challenges 
compared to wired broadband, which has reduced its effectiveness as a 
competitive substitute.213 But satellite performance has improved in 
recent years, and innovations such as SpaceX’s proposed low-earth-
orbit satellite service214 could improve latency and thus increase the 
potential for intermodal competition — undermining the rationale for 
favoring incumbents. 
3. The Subsidy Lacks a Long-Term Goal 
Finally, the Connect America Fund lacks a clearly articulable long-
term penetration goal. As noted above, the National Broadband Plan 
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estimated that it would cost approximately $24 billion (in 2010 
dollars) to bring broadband service to all American households.215 But 
the 250,000 hardest-to-reach households represent $14 billion of this 
amount.216 This calculation reveals a reality reflected in the telephone 
High-Cost Fund experience as well: as penetration approaches 100 
percent, there are significantly diminishing returns to each additional 
subsidy dollar. As Wallsten notes, the National Broadband Plan 
calculated that 96 percent of America already has broadband access (a 
rate that is even higher if satellite is included).217 This raises the 
question: at what point should the program determine that any further 
improvement in penetration is unlikely to be cost-effective? This is a 
calculation the Commission has not yet undertaken. 
C. E-rate 
Numerous scholars have criticized the efficacy of the E-rate program 
for schools and libraries. As an initial matter, one should ask whether 
this 1990s program is still relevant. The purpose of E-rate was to 
assure that every community had at least some broadband 
connectivity.218 But this “outpost” Internet model of wiring each 
community seems less relevant now that Lifeline and the Connect 
America Fund seek to wire each household. Moreover, like other 
universal service programs, one can wonder how much E-rate actually 
contributed to connecting communities that would lack broadband 
absent the subsidy. A 2001 Department of Education report notes that 
“[b]y the fall of 2000, almost all public schools in the United States 
had access to the Internet” and saw improved use of computers in 
schools, but the report could not definitively attribute these 
improvements to E-rate.219 The Office of Management and Budget 
similarly evaluated E-rate and found that “no data . . . isolates the 
 
 215 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 110, at 136. 
 216 Id. at 138. 
 217 Id. at 37 (noting ninety-five percent of housing tracts have at least one 
broadband provider); Universal Service and Rural Broadband, TECH. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 
12, 2018), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2018/02/12/universal-service-and-rural-
broadband-two-think-minimum-podcast/. The National Broadband Plan defined 
broadband as 4 Mbps down/1Mbps up. The Commission found that as of December 
2016, overall fixed broadband deployment (currently defined as 25Mbps down/3 
Mbps up) is 95.6%, with deployment to 81.7% of rural areas and over 99% of urban 
areas. Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams., 33 
FCC Rcd. at 1665, 1681. 
 218 47 U.S.C. § 254 (b)(2)-(3), (h)(1)(A)-(B) (2018). 
 219 ANNE CATTANGI ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC., INTERNET ACCESS IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND 
CLASSROOMS: 1994–2000, at 1, 3 (2001), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001071.pdf. 
  
2018] Narrowing the Digital Divide 839 
impact of E-rate funding” on classroom penetration.220 Nor has the 
Commission shown that spending more money on technology in 
schools measurably improves student learning. 
Moreover, E-rate lacks means-testing, meaning that the subsidy can, 
and often does, flow to communities wealthy enough to afford 
broadband without a subsidy. Thomas Hazlett notes that much of E-
rate’s library and school funding probably replaces other sources of 
funding that would have provided the same services through other 
means.221 This is particularly true in wealthier E-rate communities 
such as Beverly Hills, California, and Fairfax County, Virginia, where 
income is well above the national average.222 
D. Contribution Mechanism 
Perhaps most problematically, the combination of Lifeline and 
Connect America Fund reforms did little to solve the funding crisis 
that plagues the Universal Service Fund. Total disbursements for the 
four Universal Service Fund programs reached approximately $8.8 
billion in 2016,223 up from $4.6 billion in 2001.224 Disbursements are 
likely to rise further in coming years, as the program ramps up the 50 
percent increase in Lifeline support budgeted in the 2016 Lifeline 
reform order.225 
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Figure 2. 
 
Source: FCC Universal Service Monitoring Report 2016, Tables 1.10 
and 1.11 
For the past fifteen years, USF costs have been rising, while at the 
same time the revenue base is falling because people make fewer 
traditional long-distance calls. As a result, the USF surcharge has 
grown astronomically, from 3 percent in 1998 to 17.9 percent in the 
third quarter of 2018.226 
 
 226 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PROPOSED THIRD QUARTER 2018, supra note 6, at 1 
(noting the 2018 figure).  
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Figure 3. 
 
Source: 1998-2000: FCC Trends in Telephone Service Report 
2000-2018: USAC Quarterly Filings 
To its credit, the agency has taken some steps to arrest the growth in 
USF disbursement. Both before and after the 2016 reforms, the 
Commission enacted measures to root out fraud and abuse in the 
Lifeline program.227 And although the Commission anticipates that 
expanding to broadband will grow the Lifeline budget by 50 
percent,228 it has subjected both Lifeline and the Connect America 
Fund to annual budget limits, which was not the case in the preceding 
decade.229 Unfortunately both are “soft” budgets that the Commission 
may choose to override and which are subject to no penalty for 
violation, so it is unclear what practical effect these limits will have on 
the fund.230 Moreover, given the declining revenue base for interstate 
and international telephone calls, it is likely that the contribution 
factor will continue to rise even if costs are kept under control. 
This funding structure is problematic for multiple reasons. First, 
because the mechanism is self-funding, it is less transparent and not as 
subject to Congressional oversight to prevent inefficiency, fraud, and 
 
 227 See Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. at 3964. 
 228 See id. at 3965, 4040. 
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abuse. As noted above, the Commission itself determines the quarterly 
USF surcharge, based upon carrier estimates of anticipated fund 
expenses and revenue subject to the surcharge.231 This allows the fund 
to grow without the oversight and discipline that the congressional 
appropriations process provides for many other social welfare 
programs.232 
Second, the funding mechanism operates as a tax on voice service, 
which raises the overall cost of the service and thus discourages 
telecommunications use. As the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal 
Service has explained, “[l]arger USF contributions increase the risk 
that telecommunications services will become unaffordable for some, 
or even a substantial number, of consumers.”233 This effect is 
counterproductive to the fund’s primary purpose, which is to promote 
use of voice and broadband networks. 
III. REFORMING UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
The transition from telephone to broadband service provides a 
golden opportunity to reconsider the universal service program. 
Rather than adapting a flawed telephone program to fit broadband 
networks — an effort akin to fitting square pegs in round holes — 
Congress and the Commission should design a new universal service 
program for the digital age. This section sketches the contours of such 
a program. 
A. An Activity-Based Approach to Defining Broadband Service 
First, policymakers must settle on a uniform definition of 
“broadband” service. As noted above, the Commission currently uses 
different definitions in different contexts: Lifeline and the Connect 
America Fund programs promote broadband plans with speeds of at 
least ten Mbps,234 while the Commission’s annual Broadband 
Competition Reports only consider plans offering at least twenty-five 
Mbps.235 The Commission justified these benchmarks as plans were 
 
 231 See supra text accompanying notes 102–06.  
 232 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation 
Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 
239 (2005) (discussing the taxation and appropriation processes and their 
limitations).  
 233 High-Cost Universal Serv. Support Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 22 
FCC Rcd. 20477, 20483 (2007). 
 234 Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. at 3993. 
 235 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 31 
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widely advertised to, or subscribed to by, large numbers of 
consumers.236 But the Commission has never reconciled these 
different benchmarks. 
Rather than choosing somewhat arbitrary figures in ways that are 
susceptible to manipulation, policymakers should adopt an activity-
based model to define broadband service.237 This approach should 
flow from the purpose of defining minimum broadband speed: to 
assess whether a particular network provides consumers with the 
connectivity necessary to participate in the digital economy. 
The Commission should begin by identifying the core activities that 
it expects a broadband network to provide. Examining this through 
the universal service lens, the key question becomes: what online 
services does the Commission seek to make available to low-income 
households by subsidizing broadband access? This list might include 
access to email, news, job boards, or digital voice service for easy 
access to public safety officials. Consistent with former Commissioner 
Rosenworcel’s work on the “homework gap,”238 it might also include 
access to educational resources such as school intranets and associated 
multimedia applications. The agency could develop this list internally 
or with public participation pursuant to a notice of inquiry. 
Once the list is finalized, the Commission should calculate the 
minimum speed necessary to accomplish these tasks online. This 
speed would then become the benchmark for “broadband service” 
used to assess whether a household has access to advanced 
telecommunications capability. Thus, the benchmark would define a 
“basic broadband service” for purposes of administering the low-
income subsidy. The benchmark may change over time, but only if the 
agency changes the bundle of activities that it deems essential to 
participate in digital society, or if identified activities experience a shift 
in the minimum bandwidth necessary for support. 
Proponents of higher thresholds such as twenty-five Mbps often cite 
the importance of supporting multiple high-definition video streams 
in each household.239 As an initial response, it is worth noting that 
 
FCC Rcd 699, 701 (2016) (2016 Broadband Progress Report). 
 236 See, e.g., Letter from Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, to Roy 
Blunt, U.S. Senator (Mar. 1, 2016) (2016 WL 930639) (describing the process by 
which the 25 Mbps standard was chosen). 
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 238 See, e.g., Jessica Rosenworcel, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement on 
Pew Research Center Homework Gap Findings (Apr. 20, 2015) (2015 WL 1809998) 
(describing the “Homework Gap” as “the cruelest part of the new digital divide”).  
 239 See, e.g., Pub. Knowledge, Comment on Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, GN Docket No. 14-126 (Sept. 4, 2014), 
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Netflix, the world’s leading streaming video service, recommends at 
least five Mbps to stream its HD offerings.240 And streaming video is 
more bandwidth-intensive than other popular online services, like 
Skype (which recommends 1.2 Mbps for high-quality video calls).241 
Admittedly, Netflix recommends twenty-five Mbps to stream high-
resolution 4K video,242 which then-Chairman Tom Wheeler cited to 
justify the existing threshold for broadband service.243 But it is 
unlikely that the Commission should consider 4K Netflix video 
streams to be essential to participation in digital society. After all, the 
traditional Lifeline service supported telephone access but never 
subsidized cable access, because video service was considered a luxury 
rather than a necessity. One could argue that the threshold should be 
sufficient to support some streaming video — if, for example, the 
agency could show that schools regularly assign streaming video as 
part of daily homework assignments. But an activity-based model 
requires the agency to prove the need for an activity to be included in 
the bundle, rather than simply assuming it to be so. 
This activity-based approach would also help improve broadband 
competition. Households often face a choice among tiers of Internet 
speeds, without much sense of how much they need to support their 
monthly habits. An FCC inquiry that estimates the minimum speed 
necessary to accomplish particular tasks could help inform consumers 
about which plans best fit their needs, making them more savvy 
purchasers and pressuring broadband providers to focus on customers’ 
actual needs. 
B. Low-Income Assistance 
1. Quantifying the Drivers of the Low-Income Broadband Gap 
Policymakers should take a more tailored, data-driven approach to 
the low-income broadband adoption problem. Rather than the current 
model of simply offering assistance to anyone who qualifies for other 
 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521827814.pdf (arguing that the 25 Mbps benchmark 
would allow Americans to experience broadband connectivity fully).  
 240 Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/ 
en/node/306 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).  
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 242 See Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, supra note 240. 
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forms of government assistance, policymakers should study the profile 
of low-income households that currently lack broadband, with the aim 
of identifying the reasons why these homes are not online. Once the 
government identifies these drivers, it can design a program with 
eligibility criteria that focus solely on those low-income households 
without broadband access, rather than all low-income households 
broadly. This will reduce one of the most significant criticisms of the 
Lifeline program discussed above, namely the risk that subsidy dollars 
will be squandered on households that would have bought Internet 
access even without the subsidy.244 
The study should also identify metrics to determine how much of a 
monthly subsidy these eligible households would need to entice them 
to purchase a “basic broadband service” plan. This would help answer 
the question of whether a small subsidy to a large number of 
recipients, or a larger subsidy to fewer recipients, would be more 
effective at reducing the broadband gap.245 The program would 
identify the amount that a qualifying household should pay for basic 
broadband service (the “subsidized rate”) and set the subsidy at the 
difference between this subsidized rate and the average price of a basic 
broadband plan (the “subsidy amount”). The subsidy amount could 
vary by location, as it may depend on local market conditions. In 
service areas where one broadband provider has market power, the 
Commission could prevent price-gouging by limiting the subsidy to an 
amount sufficient to assure a reasonable rate of return to a reasonably 
efficient provider in that service area.246 
2. Empowering Low-Income Consumers 
The overarching goal of the low-income subsidy should be 
consumer empowerment. The primary difficulty facing low-income 
consumers is lack of purchasing power. The subsidy should narrow 
the purchasing power gap and allow low-income households to 
participate as consumers in broadband markets. This would improve 
competition in broadband markets by increasing the base of 
 
 244 See supra text accompanying notes 160–61. 
 245 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 246 Cf. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2547-49 
(2005) (Order on Remand) (requiring incumbent local exchange carriers to provide 
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consumers for whose business broadband providers compete. It also 
avoids the paternalism inherent in the existing Lifeline program.247 
To achieve this goal, the low-income subsidy should be 
competitively neutral, direct, and portable. Indeed, the Obama 
administration recommended that Lifeline reform adopt these 
principles to “ensure that low-income Americans can seize the 
opportunities of the digital age.”248 One solution could be to issue the 
subsidy in the form of a direct voucher to consumers. The voucher 
would be set at the amount necessary to allow qualified households to 
purchase basic broadband service, as defined above.249 If a customer 
chooses to purchase basic broadband service, the service provider 
would be prohibited from charging more than the subsidized rate from 
the customer, and would remit the voucher to the program for 
reimbursement. But the consumer would be free to use the voucher 
instead to purchase a (presumably less expensive) voice-only plan, or 
as a credit toward a larger bundle of telecommunications services, if 
the consumer is willing to pay more out-of-pocket. This flexibility 
extends the promise of at least voice access to those eligible 
households that cannot afford broadband even at the subsidized rate, 
without locking in voucher recipients to basic broadband service if 
they are willing to pay for additional services. 
The portable voucher structure gives purchasing power directly to 
low-income individuals, allowing them to participate in the 
telecommunications marketplace like any other consumer, and allows 
the subsidy program to benefit from competition among broadband 
providers. To attract recipients and avoid customer defection, 
providers must compete for qualified households on price and service 
as they do in the marketplace generally. While the program prevents 
providers from charging more than the average market rate for 
broadband service, providers could charge a lower price. Moreover, 
because the voucher amount depends upon the average market price 
for broadband service, less efficient providers have incentives to 
improve their operations while hyper-efficient competitors are 
rewarded accordingly. And the vouchers would be technologically 
neutral: any provider willing to offer basic broadband service would be 
eligible to participate, regardless of the platform through which the 
customer is served. 
 
 247 See supra text accompanying notes 195–99. 
 248 See Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces ConnectALL 
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This approach would be a more market-based approach to universal 
service, because it empowers low-income consumers with greater 
purchasing power with which to influence providers competing for 
their attention. Giving the voucher directly to participants, rather than 
to carriers, also reduces the incentives for fraud and abuse inherent in 
the existing Lifeline program, where carriers are incentivized to sign 
up as many Lifeline customers as possible and therefore households 
can (inadvertently or intentionally) receive multiple subsidies in 
violation of the one-per-household rule. This voucher structure would 
also bring the subsidy program in line with other government benefit 
programs that seek to increase purchasing power and market freedom 
by low-income recipients, such as SNAP and MedicAid. 
3. Addressing Other Drivers of Low-Income Nonadoption 
But it is insufficient simply to provide assistance with monthly 
access bills. As the Pew survey results suggest, monthly access plan 
costs are only one driver of broadband non-adoption.250 A 
comprehensive approach to close the low-income broadband gap 
would require attention to the other drivers as well: equipment costs 
and digital literacy. 
In addition to the monthly cost subsidy, an effective low-income 
assistance should include ways for low-income recipients to acquire 
computers and other equipment they need to get online. This can be 
done with a one-time equipment subsidy for new participants 
(perhaps drawing appropriate lessons from the Commission’s Link-Up 
program to fund installation costs for telephone service), or by 
allowing low-interest financing options for participants to purchase 
equipment. And the program should also include digital literacy 
outreach programs in local communities, so those who are 
unconvinced or uncertain about Internet use can gain a greater 
appreciation of the importance of connectivity to everyday life. 
4. Shifting Away from the Federal Communications Commission 
Finally, Congress should consider vesting oversight of this low-
income assistance program in an agency other than the Federal 
Communications Commission. The current Universal Service Fund 
focuses primarily upon compensating carriers, in part because carriers 
represent the agency’s primary area of institutional competence. USAC 
sets the quarterly contribution rate based on carriers’ estimates of 
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need. Carriers recruit Lifeline participants and confirm eligibility, and 
the Commission issues Lifeline payments directly to carriers to cover 
the cost of serving the Lifeline population. It is notable that the 
Lifeline consumer does not interface directly with the agency at any 
step of the process. 
It may be that the voucher program would be better administered by 
a different agency that better understands the issues facing those in 
poverty. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, 
describes itself as “U.S. Government’s principal agency for protecting 
the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, 
especially for those who are least able to help themselves.”251 One of 
the agency’s strategic goals is to “Strengthen the Economic and Social 
Well-Being of Americans Across the Lifespan,” by “[e]ncourag[ing] 
self-sufficiency and personal responsibility, and eliminate[ing] barriers 
to economic opportunity” and “[m]aximiz[ing] the independence, 
well-being, and health of older adults, people with disabilities, and 
their families and caregivers.”252 A voucher-based Lifeline program 
would fit comfortably within the department’s efforts to pursue these 
objectives and would vest administration of the initiative in an agency 
experienced with, and knowledgeable of, the difficulties faced by low-
income Americans that the program seems to serve. Congress may 
ultimately decide not to shift the program to HHS or another agency, 
but this decision should be based upon a rational assessment of the 
Commission’s strengths and weaknesses compared to those of other 
potential departments. 
The Commission has explained that “[t]he purpose of the Lifeline 
program is to provide a hand up, not a hand out, to those low-income 
consumers who truly need assistance connecting to and remaining 
connected to telecommunications and information services. The 
program’s real success will be [made] evident by the stories of Lifeline 
beneficiaries who move off of Lifeline because they have used the 
program as a stepping stone to improve their economic stability.”253 By 
converting Lifeline into a targeted, direct, portable voucher 
administered by an agency whose core competencies include helping 
low-income Americans, the government can focus on those who truly 
need assistance and enhance recipients’ purchasing power while 
treating them with the dignity implied by this mission statement. 
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C. Solving the Availability Gap 
A more targeted subsidy will help close the broadband adoption gap 
within low-income communities where broadband is currently 
available. But it will not solve the separate problem of closing the 
broadband availability gap in the areas of the country where 
broadband networks are not available. To solve this problem, a 
separate program akin to the Connect America Fund is necessary. 
But what the Commission treats as one broadband availability gap is 
in fact comprised of two distinct territories. In some unserved areas, 
the economics are such that network installation costs make market 
entry uneconomical, but if those one-time construction costs were 
covered, the network could cover its monthly operating expenses from 
subscription revenue. In other areas, the hardest-to-reach areas, even 
providing the network for free is insufficient, as subscription revenue 
would be insufficient to cover the provider’s monthly operating 
expenses. 
To narrow the broadband availability gap, the government should 
prioritize territories in the former category. Consistent with the 
National Broadband Plan’s recommendations,254 the government 
should focus the Connect America Fund on one-time network 
construction costs and accelerate the move away from the ongoing 
carrier subsidies that are legacies of the High-Cost Fund. The funds 
should be tied to demonstrable construction benchmarks and subject 
to forfeiture if the recipient does not make substantial progress toward 
its buildout objectives. Subsidizing the construction of sustainable 
networks would most efficiently leverage the fund’s limited dollars to 
provide connectivity to as many households as possible. It would also 
avoid the problem of carriers using subsidies to fund general expenses 
rather than network buildout.255 
To distribute the funds, the government should rely upon the 
reverse-auction mechanism that the Commission adopted to allocate 
Connect America Fund Phase II funds that were refused by the 
incumbent. For each given geographic region, the fund administrator 
should identify unserved areas and solicit bids from carriers as to the 
amount of subsidy the carrier would accept to serve those areas.256 
Unlike Connect America Phase II, these bids should be technologically 
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neutral and should be awarded without favoring the incumbent 
carrier. If the incumbent is the most efficient provider to close the 
availability gap in a region, then it will win the reverse auction. The 
winning bidder will receive a subsidy in the amount of the winning 
bid and will be required to provide basic broadband service 
throughout the service area within a fixed number of years. 
But this Article recommends that the auctions be administered by 
state public utility commissions rather than by the FCC. As noted 
above, there exists a wide range of potential factors contributing to the 
availability gap. The challenges to rural broadband construction are 
myriad and diverse, and the approach that works in flat Kansas may 
not be readily portable to mountainous West Virginia. The Connect 
America Fund envisioned a Commission-led study of all these areas to 
determine the amount of money to offer incumbent carriers in each 
state. But the incumbents refused subsidies in multiple states,257 
suggesting that the centralized study approach was less than ideal. 
Instead of pursuing this model, Congress should allocate funds in the 
form of block grants that states can use, perhaps in combination with 
state funds, to conduct reverse auctions and narrow their respective 
availability gaps. 
The shift in administration to state public utility commissions is not 
as revolutionary as it may seem. In fact, in January 2017 the Federal 
Communications Commission granted a waiver that allowed New 
York to administer its CAF Phase II funds in coordination with the 
state’s own New NY Broadband Program rather than having to follow 
Connect America Fund guidelines.258 Other states have expressed 
interest in receiving similar waivers.259 Even absent waivers, CAF 
Phase II awarded funding on a state-by-state basis, meaning the 
program recognizes states as the appropriate level to disburse the 
subsidies. 
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There are myriad reasons to vest administrative oversight in state 
public utility commissions. First, the challenges to availability may 
differ significantly by state, turning on local knowledge of conditions 
within a state that state officials are better positioned than their federal 
counterparts to know and understand.260 State public utility 
commissions also have significant expertise in telecommunications 
regulation, having been responsible for regulating intrastate 
communications in the pre-Internet era.261 This expertise has gone 
underused in recent years, as the distinction between local and 
interstate telephone markets has disappeared and the federal 
government largely preempted state authority to regulate broadband 
networks.262 Moreover, most states currently administer their own 
state-level universal service programs.263 So vesting administration at 
state levels can leverage existing experience and complement ongoing 
state initiatives. State officials are closer to the constituents they 
regulate and therefore are more likely to respond to local concerns, 
suggesting they are more motivated to monitor compliance with 
buildout projects and move quickly to completion.264 
State-level administration of block grant funds may also help 
develop new and better ways to solve the availability gap.265 The 
decentralization of authority promotes regulatory diversity, allowing 
states to serve as “laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”266 Allowing states 
leeway to determine how best to allocate buildout funds, and on what 
conditions, may yield better solutions than the default regime 
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currently administered nationwide (except in New York) under the 
Connect America Fund. 
For those hardest-to-reach areas, it may be necessary to recognize 
that providing basic broadband service may simply not be cost-
effective. The National Broadband Plan hinted at this, noting that of 
the $24 billion required to close the broadband availability gap, $14 
billion would go to wire the hardest 250,000 homes.267 The fact that a 
community’s telecommunications costs are unusually high is not, 
alone, a reason to subsidize them. There are a wide range of goods 
integral to modern life whose costs vary dramatically by location — 
for example, housing, food, or gasoline. Yet few suggest that because a 
two-bedroom apartment is more expensive in Manhattan than in 
Houston, we should provide a federal housing subsidy to all Big Apple 
residents. Similarly, at some point the government must refuse to 
subsidize what is effectively a lifestyle choice by those who choose to 
live in a region with an extremely high cost of service. Given the near-
universal availability of satellite service, the government should 
conclude that the difference between satellite-quality service and basic 
broadband service is not sufficiently wide to require significant and 
ongoing subsidies to these hardest-to-reach communities. 
D. E-rate 
As noted above, the E-rate program has outlasted its usefulness. 
With the Connect America Fund focused on bringing basic broadband 
service to each household, the wiring of all libraries and schools seems 
somewhat duplicative.268 Given Hazlett’s analysis showing that this 
funding largely displaces local expenditures rather than increasing 
connectivity in America,269 Congress should decide that broadband 
access is no more integral to a library or school’s mission than any 
other part of the institution’s operation. The costs of this access should 
be incorporated into the institution’s budget and paid the same way all 
other expenses are, so the local community can make an accurate 
assessment of whether its institutions require such service, and at 
what level or cost. 
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E. Contribution Reform: Funding the Future of Universal Service 
Finally, Congress should abandon the fund’s increasingly arcane 
contribution methodology. The simplest and most elegant solution to 
the contribution problem is simply to fund universal service through a 
line item in the federal budget like most other entitlement programs. 
Other proposed solutions, such as a tax on telephone numbers or IP 
addresses, while likely an improvement over the existing revenue-
based regime, suffer from similar problems as the current 
methodology: they are underinclusive and encourage strategic 
behavior by consumers, while discouraging the very services the 
program seeks to subsidize. 
Through the appropriations process, Congress can bring some 
much-needed fiscal discipline to the Universal Service Fund. The 
program would be more transparent, as funding would be set by 
congressional deliberations rather than the murky, semi-private 
Universal Service Administrative Company.270 Because taxpayer 
dollars are at stake, Congress would be more likely to use inquiries 
and oversight hearings to monitor the program for fraud and abuse. 
The program would be subject to a hard budgetary cap on annual 
expenditures, which would require the Commission to wring 
inefficiencies out of the system in order to better serve the public 
within congressional fiscal constraints. And it would provide a greater 
measure of democratic accountability. As Krotoszynski has noted, the 
Constitution provides special restrictions on the taxing power (such as 
the requirement that all revenue bills originate in the House) because 
the framers were particularly concerned about maintaining democratic 
control and accountability over revenue and appropriations powers.271 
The current surcharge functions as a tax, raising revenue for the 
purpose of pursuing the fund’s myriad objectives, but without the 
procedural safeguards that protect against abuse. Subjecting the fund 
to the appropriations process would shed some important light on the 
program and improve both its efficiency and legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public. 
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CONCLUSION 
America’s migration to broadband networks presents a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to bring transformational change to an 
outdated, mismanaged assistance program. While the Commission has 
attempted to bring about this change, its efforts are unlikely to 
significantly narrow America’s broadband gap. Policymakers should 
capitalize on this brief window of opportunity by adopting a direct, 
portable voucher program that helps low-income households 
participate as equals in the market for telecommunications services. 
And it should offer states block grants to build out underserved areas 
through a reverse auction mechanism that extends broadband access 
to new households as efficiently as possible. Finally, it should replace 
the arcane contribution mechanism with a more stable, transparent 
funding source that does not overly burden broadband consumers and 
providers. 
